"""Tests for agent.redact -- secret masking in logs and output.""" import logging import pytest from agent.redact import redact_cdp_url, redact_sensitive_text, RedactingFormatter @pytest.fixture(autouse=True) def _ensure_redaction_enabled(monkeypatch): """Ensure HERMES_REDACT_SECRETS is not disabled by prior test imports.""" monkeypatch.delenv("HERMES_REDACT_SECRETS", raising=False) # Also patch the module-level snapshot so it reflects the cleared env var monkeypatch.setattr("agent.redact._REDACT_ENABLED", True) class TestKnownPrefixes: def test_gitlab_token_prefixes(self): """GitLab token families redact via their literal prefixes. Ported from openclaw/openclaw#112954; follow-up invited in #4541. """ tokens = [ # NOTE: every token is prefix + suffix CONCATENATION so no # contiguous token literal exists in this file — GitHub push # protection blocks realistic GitLab-token-shaped literals. "glpat-" + "Zx9AbCdEfGhIjKlMnOpQ", # personal access token "gloas-" + "a" * 64, # OAuth application secret "gldt-" + "AbCdEfGhIjKlMnOpQrSt", # deploy token "glrt-" + "t1_AbCdEfGhIjKlMnOpQrSt", # runner auth token "glrt-" + "A" * 27 + ".01." + "a" * 9, # routable (dotted) runner token "glrtr-" + "B" * 27 + ".01." + "b" * 9, # routable runner registration "glcbt-" + "a1B2_AbCdEfGhIjKlMnOpQ", # CI/CD job token "glptt-" + "c" * 40, # pipeline trigger token "glft-" + "AbCdEfGhIjKlMnOp", # feed token "glimt-" + "AbCdEfGhIjKlMnOpQrStUvWxY", # incoming mail token "glagent-" + "d" * 50, # agent (KAS) token "glsoat-" + "AbCdEfGhIjKlMnOpQrSt", # service-account token "glffct-" + "AbCdEfGhIjKlMnOpQrSt", # feature-flags client token "glwt-" + "AbCdEfGhIjKlMnOpQrSt", # workspace token "GR1348941" + "E" * 20, # legacy runner registration ] for token in tokens: result = redact_sensitive_text(f"leaked {token} in output") secret_body = token.split("-", 1)[-1] if "-" in token else token[9:] assert secret_body not in result, f"{token!r} survived redaction: {result!r}" def test_gitlab_prefix_requires_word_boundary_and_length(self): """Prose and embedded identifiers must not false-positive.""" for benign in [ "the glossary explains gitlab tokens", # no prefix at all "glpat-short", # suffix under 10 chars "myglpat-AbCdEfGhIjKlMnOpQrSt", # embedded — lookbehind blocks ]: assert redact_sensitive_text(benign) == benign def test_slack_token(self): token = "xoxb-" + "0" * 12 + "-" + "a" * 14 result = redact_sensitive_text(token) assert "a" * 14 not in result def test_fireworks_keys(self): samples = [ "fw-" + "A" * 40, "fw_" + "B" * 40, "fpk_" + "C" * 40, ] for token in samples: result = redact_sensitive_text(f"provider error {token}") assert token not in result assert "..." in result def test_short_fireworks_like_words_unchanged(self): text = "fw-tooshort fw_tooshort fpk_tooshort" assert redact_sensitive_text(text) == text class TestEnvAssignments: def test_export_api_key(self): text = "export OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-proj-abc123def456ghi789jkl012" result = redact_sensitive_text(text) assert "OPENAI_API_KEY=" in result assert "abc123def456" not in result def test_non_secret_env_unchanged(self): text = "HOME=/home/user" result = redact_sensitive_text(text) assert result == text def test_export_whitespace_preserved(self): # Regression: #4367 — whitespace before uppercase env var must be preserved text = "export SECRET_TOKEN=mypassword" result = redact_sensitive_text(text) assert result.startswith("export ") assert "SECRET_TOKEN=" in result assert "mypassword" not in result class TestEnvLookupPreserved: """Programmatic env var lookups must not be corrupted (issue #2852).""" def test_os_getenv_single_quote_uppercase_key(self): text = "MY_API_KEY=os.getenv('OPENAI_API_KEY')" assert redact_sensitive_text(text, force=True) == text def test_real_env_value_still_redacted(self): text = "HOMEASSISTANT_TOKEN=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.abc123.xyz" result = redact_sensitive_text(text, force=True) assert "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9" not in result def test_multiline_prose_with_code_snippet(self): text = """Set it up like this: HA_TOKEN=os.getenv('HOMEASSISTANT_TOKEN') if not HA_TOKEN: raise ValueError('Missing credentials')""" result = redact_sensitive_text(text, force=True) assert "os.getenv('HOMEASSISTANT_TOKEN')" in result class TestJsonFields: def test_json_api_key(self): text = '{"apiKey": "sk-proj-abc123def456ghi789jkl012"}' result = redact_sensitive_text(text) assert "abc123def456" not in result def test_json_non_secret_unchanged(self): text = '{"name": "John", "model": "gpt-4"}' result = redact_sensitive_text(text) assert result == text class TestAuthHeaders: def test_authorization_prose_unchanged(self): # "authorization" without a colon-delimited value is plain prose. text = "the authorization model is fully open" assert redact_sensitive_text(text) == text def test_token_flush_against_double_quote_preserves_quote(self): # Regression for #43083: a token sitting flush against a closing # double quote must NOT pull that quote into the mask. Greedy \S+ # used to eat it, turning value corruption into syntax corruption # (unterminated quote → shell EOF). text = 'curl -H "Authorization: Bearer sk-abcdef1234567890"' result = redact_sensitive_text(text) assert "sk-abcdef1234567890" not in result assert result.count('"') == 2, result # both quotes survive assert result.endswith('"'), result class TestApiKeyHeaders: def test_x_api_key_header_masked(self): text = "x-api-key: opaque-provider-key-1234567890" result = redact_sensitive_text(text) assert "x-api-key:" in result assert "opaque-provider-key" not in result def test_x_api_key_in_curl_command_masked(self): text = 'curl -H "x-api-key: sk-local-VERYsecret-999888" https://api.example.com' result = redact_sensitive_text(text) assert "VERYsecret" not in result assert "https://api.example.com" in result def test_api_key_header_masked(self): text = "api-key: anotherOpaqueSecret1234567" result = redact_sensitive_text(text) assert "anotherOpaqueSecret" not in result class TestTelegramTokens: def test_bot_token(self): text = "bot123456789:ABCDEfghij-KLMNopqrst_UVWXyz12345" result = redact_sensitive_text(text) assert "ABCDEfghij" not in result assert "123456789:***" in result def test_raw_token(self): text = "12345678901:ABCDEfghijKLMNopqrstUVWXyz1234567890" result = redact_sensitive_text(text) assert "ABCDEfghij" not in result class TestPassthrough: def test_empty_string(self): assert redact_sensitive_text("") == "" def test_non_string_input_dict_coerced_and_redacted(self): result = redact_sensitive_text({"token": "sk-proj-abc123def456ghi789jkl012"}) assert "abc123def456" not in result class TestRedactingFormatter: def test_formats_and_redacts(self): formatter = RedactingFormatter("%(message)s") record = logging.LogRecord( name="test", level=logging.INFO, pathname="", lineno=0, msg="Key is sk-proj-abc123def456ghi789jkl012", args=(), exc_info=None, ) result = formatter.format(record) assert "abc123def456" not in result assert "sk-pro" in result class TestPrintenvSimulation: """Simulate what happens when the agent runs `env` or `printenv`.""" def test_full_env_dump(self): env_dump = """HOME=/home/user PATH=/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-proj-abc123def456ghi789jkl012mno345 OPENROUTER_API_KEY=sk-or-v1-reallyLongSecretKeyValue12345678 FIRECRAWL_API_KEY=fc-shortkey123456789012 TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN=bot987654321:ABCDEfghij-KLMNopqrst_UVWXyz12345 SHELL=/bin/bash USER=teknium""" result = redact_sensitive_text(env_dump) # Secrets should be masked assert "abc123def456" not in result assert "reallyLongSecretKey" not in result assert "ABCDEfghij" not in result # Non-secrets should survive assert "HOME=/home/user" in result assert "SHELL=/bin/bash" in result assert "USER=teknium" in result class TestSecretCapturePayloadRedaction: def test_secret_value_field_redacted(self): text = '{"success": true, "secret_value": "sk-test-secret-1234567890"}' result = redact_sensitive_text(text) assert "sk-test-secret-1234567890" not in result class TestElevenLabsTavilyExaKeys: """Regression tests for ElevenLabs (sk_), Tavily (tvly-), and Exa (exa_) keys.""" def test_elevenlabs_key_redacted(self): text = "ELEVENLABS_API_KEY=sk_abc123def456ghi789jklmnopqrstu" result = redact_sensitive_text(text) assert "abc123def456ghi" not in result def test_all_three_in_env_dump(self): env_dump = ( "HOME=/home/user\n" "ELEVENLABS_API_KEY=sk_abc123def456ghi789jklmnopqrstu\n" "TAVILY_API_KEY=tvly-ABCdef123456789GHIJKL0000\n" "EXA_API_KEY=exa_XYZ789abcdef000000000000000\n" "SHELL=/bin/bash\n" ) result = redact_sensitive_text(env_dump) assert "abc123def456ghi" not in result assert "ABCdef123456789" not in result assert "XYZ789abcdef" not in result assert "HOME=/home/user" in result assert "SHELL=/bin/bash" in result class TestJWTTokens: """JWT tokens start with eyJ (base64 for '{') and have dot-separated parts.""" def test_2part_jwt(self): text = "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIn0" result = redact_sensitive_text(text) assert "eyJzdWIi" not in result def test_jwt_preserves_surrounding_text(self): text = "before eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIn0 after" result = redact_sensitive_text(text) assert result.startswith("before ") assert result.endswith(" after") class TestDiscordMentions: """Discord mention snowflakes (<@ID> / <@!ID>) are public syntax, not secrets — they must pass through the redactor unchanged so multi-bot @-pings (DISCORD_ALLOW_BOTS=mentions) keep resolving. See issue #35611.""" def test_normal_mention_passes_through(self): text = "Hello <@222589316709220353>" assert redact_sensitive_text(text) == text class TestWebUrlsNotRedacted: """Web URLs (http/https/wss) pass through unchanged — magic-link checkouts, OAuth callbacks the agent is meant to follow, and pre-signed share URLs must reach the tool intact. Known credential shapes inside URLs (sk-, ghp_, JWTs) are still caught by the prefix and JWT regexes. DB connection-string passwords are still caught by _DB_CONNSTR_RE. """ def test_oauth_callback_code_passes_through(self): text = "GET https://api.example.com/oauth/cb?code=abc123xyz789&state=csrf_ok" assert redact_sensitive_text(text) == text def test_known_prefix_inside_url_still_redacted(self): """sk-/ghp_/JWT-shaped values inside a URL are still caught by _PREFIX_RE / _JWT_RE — the carve-out is for opaque tokens only.""" text = "https://evil.com/steal?key=sk-" + "a" * 30 result = redact_sensitive_text(text) assert "sk-" + "a" * 30 not in result def test_db_connstr_password_still_redacted(self): """DB schemes (postgres/mysql/mongodb/redis/amqp) keep their userinfo redaction via _DB_CONNSTR_RE — connection strings are not web URLs the agent navigates to.""" text = "postgres://admin:dbpass@db.internal:5432/app" result = redact_sensitive_text(text) assert "dbpass" not in result class TestStrictUrlCredentialRedaction: @pytest.mark.parametrize( ("text", "secret", "expected"), [ ( "https://x.test/#access_token=FRAG_SECRET&view=public", "FRAG_SECRET", "https://x.test/#access_token=***&view=public", ), ( "/resume?token=REL_SECRET&view=public", "REL_SECRET", "/resume?token=***&view=public", ), ( "https://x.test/cb?client%5Fsecret=ENC_SECRET&view=public", "ENC_SECRET", "https://x.test/cb?client%5Fsecret=***&view=public", ), ( "https://x.test/cb?client%255Fsecret=DOUBLE_SECRET&view=public", "DOUBLE_SECRET", "https://x.test/cb?client%255Fsecret=***&view=public", ), ( "/resume?token=SEMICOLON_SECRET;view=public", "SEMICOLON_SECRET", "/resume?token=***;view=public", ), ( "//user:NET_SECRET@x.test/path", "NET_SECRET", "//user:***@x.test/path", ), ], ) def test_masks_all_url_reference_forms_only_when_opted_in( self, text, secret, expected ): assert redact_sensitive_text(text) == text result = redact_sensitive_text(text, redact_url_credentials=True) assert secret not in result assert result == expected def test_similarly_named_public_params_remain_unchanged(self): text = "/metrics?token_count=17&session_id=public" assert redact_sensitive_text(text, redact_url_credentials=True) == text class TestBareTokenUserinfoRedaction: """Regression tests for #6396 — a bare credential in URL userinfo (``scheme://TOKEN@host``, no ``user:pass`` colon) is redacted. This is the git-remote-with-embedded-password shape. The colon form ``user:pass@`` and query-string tokens are deliberately left to pass through (#34029) so magic-link / OAuth round-trip skills keep working — see TestWebUrlsNotRedacted for those invariants. """ def test_git_remote_bare_password_redacted(self): """Exact bug scenario: password in a git remote URL.""" text = ( "git remote set-url origin " "https://MYPASSWORDWASDISLAYEDHERE@github.com/unclehowell/FCUK.git" ) result = redact_sensitive_text(text) assert "MYPASSWORDWASDISLAYEDHERE" not in result assert "@github.com" in result assert "unclehowell/FCUK.git" in result def test_ssh_bare_token_redacted(self): text = "ssh://longtoken1234567@gitlab.com/project.git" result = redact_sensitive_text(text) assert "longtoken1234567" not in result assert "@gitlab.com" in result def test_ftp_bare_token_redacted(self): text = "ftp://ftptoken123456@ftp.example.com/files" result = redact_sensitive_text(text) assert "ftptoken123456" not in result def test_user_pass_form_still_passes_through(self): """The ``user:pass@`` colon form must NOT be redacted (#34029).""" text = "URL: https://user:supersecretpw@host.example.com/path" assert redact_sensitive_text(text) == text def test_short_username_not_redacted(self): """Short userinfo (git, admin, deploy) below the 8-char floor passes.""" for text in ( "https://git@github.com/user/repo.git", "https://admin@example.com/x", "https://deploy@host.com/y", ): assert redact_sensitive_text(text) == text def test_email_in_path_not_redacted(self): """An ``@`` in a path/query is not userinfo — the token class stops at ``/``, so emails after the first slash are never treated as a credential.""" for text in ( "https://example.com/search?q=user@example.com", "https://example.com/users/john@doe.com/profile", ): assert redact_sensitive_text(text) == text class TestFormBodyRedaction: """Form-urlencoded body redaction (k=v&k=v with no other text).""" def test_pure_form_body(self): text = "password=mysecret&username=bob&token=opaqueValue" result = redact_sensitive_text(text) assert "mysecret" not in result assert "opaqueValue" not in result assert "username=bob" in result def test_non_form_text_unchanged(self): """Sentences with `&` should NOT trigger form redaction.""" text = "I have password=foo and other things" # contains spaces result = redact_sensitive_text(text) # The space breaks the form regex; passthrough expected. assert "I have" in result def test_multiline_text_not_form(self): """Multi-line text is never treated as form body.""" text = "first=1\nsecond=2" # Should pass through (still subject to other redactors) assert "first=1" in redact_sensitive_text(text) class TestLowercaseDottedConfigKeys: """Issue #16413 — config-file passwords in lowercase/dotted/colon keys must be redacted. The uppercase _ENV_ASSIGN_RE missed these, leaking `spring.datasource.password=...` and `password: ...` from `cat`'d config files. Carve-outs: prose, code (#4367), and web URLs are left untouched. """ def test_properties_file_dump(self): text = ( "server.port=8080\n" "spring.datasource.username=admin\n" "spring.datasource.password=Sup3rS3cret!\n" "logging.level.root=INFO" ) result = redact_sensitive_text(text) assert "Sup3rS3cret!" not in result assert "server.port=8080" in result # non-secret keys preserved assert "username=admin" in result # --- carve-outs: must NOT redact --- def test_prose_mid_sentence_password_unchanged(self): # Not line-anchored, not dotted → conversational text, leave alone. text = "I have password=foo and other things" assert redact_sensitive_text(text) == text class TestConfigKeyRedosResistance: """The dotted-key patterns must not backtrack exponentially (ReDoS). Before the possessive-quantifier rewrite, a non-matching run of ~40 dotted segments took ~30ms and doubled every ~4 segments; 100 segments would effectively hang the redactor (it runs on every log line). """ def test_long_dotted_run_completes_fast(self): import time # 100 dotted segments with no '=' — worst case for the old pattern. text = ".".join(["segment"] * 100) + " end" t0 = time.perf_counter() assert redact_sensitive_text(text) == text assert time.perf_counter() - t0 < 2.0 def test_long_dotted_run_with_keyword_completes_fast(self): """Exercise _CFG_DOTTED_RE directly (bypasses the keyword pre-gate). The pre-gate skips the regex when no secret keyword is present, so test_long_dotted_run_completes_fast only guards the pre-gate. This test includes a keyword but no '=' so the regex runs and must still complete quickly thanks to the possessive quantifiers. """ import time text = ".".join(["segment"] * 100) + ".token end" t0 = time.perf_counter() assert redact_sensitive_text(text) == text assert time.perf_counter() - t0 < 2.0 def test_long_dotted_secret_still_redacted(self): # Possessive quantifiers must not change matching behavior. text = ".".join(["seg"] * 50) + ".password=Sup3rS3cret!" result = redact_sensitive_text(text) assert "Sup3rS3cret!" not in result assert ".password=" in result def test_yaml_assign_redos_resistance(self): """_YAML_ASSIGN_RE must not backtrack excessively on long inputs.""" import time # 100 lines of a long dotted key with a secret keyword but no # matching colon-value form — stresses the regex without matching. line = "a." * 50 + "token not_an_assignment" text = "\n".join([line] * 100) t0 = time.perf_counter() redact_sensitive_text(text) assert time.perf_counter() - t0 < 2.0 def test_yaml_assign_secret_still_redacted(self): # Possessive quantifiers must not change YAML matching behavior. text = "spring.datasource.password: hunter2" result = redact_sensitive_text(text) assert "hunter2" not in result assert "password:" in result class TestXaiToken: KEY = "xai-ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstu" def test_bare_token_masked(self): result = redact_sensitive_text(f"using key {self.KEY}", force=True) assert self.KEY not in result assert "xai-AB" in result def test_too_short_not_masked(self): short = "xai-tooshort" result = redact_sensitive_text(f"text {short} here", force=True) assert short in result class TestDbConnstrCodeOutput: """Regression tests for issue #33801 — _DB_CONNSTR_RE corrupting code output. Two distinct flaws, both confined to displayed tool OUTPUT (read_file / terminal / execute_code), never the on-disk content: 1. The password group ``[^@]+`` was greedy across newlines, so on a multi-line block it scanned past the DSN line to the next stray ``@`` (e.g. a Python ``@decorator``), replacing everything in between with ``***`` — dropping lines and concatenating the next one. 2. An f-string DSN template (``f"postgresql://{user}:{pass}@{host}"``) is not a live credential, but was redacted anyway. Under ``code_file=True`` a pure ``{...}`` brace password is now preserved. """ MULTILINE = ( ' return f"postgresql://{auth}@{self.pg_host}:' '{self.pg_port}/{self.pg_database}"\n' "\n" ' @model_validator(mode="after")\n' ' def _validate_critical_settings(self) -> "Settings":' ) def test_literal_connstr_still_redacted_with_code_file(self): """A real password in a literal DSN is still masked under code_file.""" text = "postgresql://admin:realpassword@db.internal:5432/app" result = redact_sensitive_text(text, code_file=True, force=True) assert "realpassword" not in result assert "***" in result def test_literal_connstr_redacted_all_schemes(self): for scheme, secret in [ ("postgres", "pgsecret1234"), ("mysql", "mysqlsecret99"), ("redis", "redissecret77"), ("mongodb+srv", "mongosecret55"), ("amqp", "amqpsecret33"), ]: text = f"{scheme}://user:{secret}@host:1234/db" result = redact_sensitive_text(text, code_file=True, force=True) assert secret not in result, scheme def test_literal_connstr_in_log_line_redacted(self): text = "connected via postgres://user:s3cr3tpw@host:5432/db ok" result = redact_sensitive_text(text, force=True) assert "s3cr3tpw" not in result class TestTerminalOutputRedaction: """is_env_dump_command + redact_terminal_output — issue #43025. Terminal/process stdout must be redacted on every surface (foreground `terminal` AND background `process(poll/log/wait)`). Env-dump commands get the ENV-assignment pass so opaque tokens (no vendor prefix) are masked; other commands stay on the code_file path to avoid false positives. """ def test_is_env_dump_command_detection(self): from agent.redact import is_env_dump_command assert is_env_dump_command("printenv") assert is_env_dump_command("env") assert is_env_dump_command("env | grep API") assert is_env_dump_command("set") assert is_env_dump_command("export") assert is_env_dump_command("declare -x") assert is_env_dump_command("cat /tmp/x && printenv") assert not is_env_dump_command("python app.py") assert not is_env_dump_command("cat config.py") assert not is_env_dump_command("printf 'TOKEN=x'") assert not is_env_dump_command("") assert not is_env_dump_command(None) def test_disabled_passes_through(self, monkeypatch): from agent.redact import redact_terminal_output monkeypatch.setattr("agent.redact._REDACT_ENABLED", False) out = "CUSTOM_TOKEN=zzzopaque1234567890abcdef" red = redact_terminal_output(out, "printenv") assert "zzzopaque1234567890abcdef" in red class TestFileReadNonReusableRedaction: """#35519: prefix-matched credentials in FILE CONTENT (read_file / search_files / cat) must be redacted to a NON-REUSABLE sentinel — not a head/tail mask that looks like a real-but-truncated key and gets written back to config (corrupting the credential -> 401).""" GHP = "ghp_S1abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0Pn2T" # realistic GitHub PAT shape SK = "sk-proj-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789" def test_file_read_does_not_leak_secret_body(self): """Crucial: file_read must NOT expose the real key (no un-redact).""" out = redact_sensitive_text(f"token: {self.GHP}", force=True, file_read=True) # No run of the secret body survives. assert "S1abcdefghij" not in out assert self.GHP not in out assert "Pn2T" not in out # not even the tail (the old mask kept it) def test_file_read_sentinel_is_not_a_plausible_key(self): """The sentinel can't be mistaken for / written back as a usable key: the old mask was a 13-char `ghp_S1...Pn2T` that broke GitHub auth when an agent re-saved it. The sentinel is syntactically invalid as a token (contains « » … and ':'), so it can't round-trip into a dead key.""" out = redact_sensitive_text(f"GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN: {self.GHP}", force=True, file_read=True) masked = out.split(": ", 1)[1].strip() # Not a bare token: contains the sentinel delimiters. assert masked.startswith("«") and masked.endswith("»") assert "…" in masked class TestFireworksToken: KEY = "fw_" + "A" * 40 def test_bare_token_masked(self): result = redact_sensitive_text(f"fireworks error: key {self.KEY}", force=True) assert self.KEY not in result assert "fw_AA" in result def test_too_short_not_masked(self): short = "fw_tooshort" result = redact_sensitive_text(f"text {short} here", force=True) assert short in result class TestRedactCdpUrl: """redact_cdp_url() is the single chokepoint for CDP endpoint log redaction. Unlike the global pass (which deliberately lets web-URL query params and userinfo through for OAuth/magic-link workflows), CDP endpoint credentials are pure secrets and must always be masked. Both the browser tool's session/discovery logs and the supervisor's attach-timeout error route through this helper. """ def test_masks_multiple_query_credentials(self): url = "wss://provider.example/session?token=aaa-secret&apikey=bbb-secret" out = redact_cdp_url(url) assert "aaa-secret" not in out assert "bbb-secret" not in out def test_none_returns_empty(self): assert redact_cdp_url(None) == "" class TestKeywordWordBoundary: """Ported from nearai/ironclaw#6129 — a secret keyword embedded inside a larger prose word (``Secretary`` ⊃ ``secret``, ``tokenizer`` ⊃ ``token``, ``authored`` ⊃ ``auth``) must NOT trigger the lowercase/dotted/YAML config passes. Real key shapes (separators, camelCase, acronyms, plurals, common concatenated compounds, all-caps env style) must keep redacting. """ # ── prose words embedding a keyword are preserved ────────────────── def test_secretary_yaml_value_preserved(self): text = "Secretary: JanetYellen1234567890" assert redact_sensitive_text(text) == text # ── real key shapes still redact ──────────────────────────────────── def test_separator_keys_still_redacted(self): for text in ( "client_secret: abc123def456ghi789jkl", "auth_token: xyz789xyz789xyz789xyz", "my_secret: topvalue123456789012345", "db.password=hunter2verylongpassword", ): result = redact_sensitive_text(text) assert result != text, text def test_camelcase_keys_still_redacted(self): for text in ( "clientSecret: abc123def456ghi789jkl", "secretKey: abc123def456ghi789jklmno", "APIToken: abc123def456ghi789jklmn", ): result = redact_sensitive_text(text) assert result != text, text def test_plural_keys_still_redacted(self): text = "secrets: hunter2hunter2hunter2hh" result = redact_sensitive_text(text) assert "hunter2hunter2hunter2hh" not in result